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Abstract: 
This paper adds to much existing knowledge of reasons to be pluralist about science and its 
methods. The pluralism that I defend rebuts Karl Popper and some other philosophers, such 
as the early logical positivists, who contend (actually, often simply assume) that there are 
universal procedures, laws or methods that are defining of science, and so are applicable to 
all fields of scientific enquiry. Philosophers like Stephen Kellert and Helen Longino have 
defended respectively the thesis of pluralism about occidental science and the related thesis 
that its epistemologies (in the plural) are “local” not only within cognitive geography at a 
time but also historically. Building on this, I move further in this paper to defend a cross-
cultural epistemic pluralism, broadening the idea of local epistemologies so that it concerns 
as well inquiry concerning the world in systematic indigenous societies.  
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Introduction 
This paper adds to much existing knowledge of reasons to be pluralist about science 
and its methods. The pluralism that I defend rebuts Popper and some other philosophers, such 
as the early logical positivists, who contend (actually, often simply assume) that there are 
universal procedures, laws or methods that are defining of science, and so are applicable to 
all fields of scientific enquiry. What they contend or assume does not allow for the possibility 
that I explore here, that ‘science’ (or ‘scientific’) is a family-resemblance term in 
Wittgenstein’s sense, variously applicable to kinds of inquiry that share no one set of 
European Scientific Journal    October edition vol. 8, No.23   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
104 
 
characteristics in common. Philosophers like Stephen Kellert and Helen Longino have 
defended respectively the thesis of pluralism about occidental science and the related thesis 
that its epistemologies (in the plural) are “local” not only within cognitive geography at a 
time but also historically. Building on this, I move further in this paper to defend a cross-
cultural epistemic pluralism, broadening the idea of local epistemologies so that it concerns 
as well inquiry concerning the world in indigenous societies.  
I shall defend the value of cross-cultural polylogue. My proposal is that when two 
cultures, for instance, dialogue, ideally people in both cultures learn from their understanding 
of the other an expanded sense of the possible.  This would represent the possibilities of 
mutual benefit if there is intelligent dialogue concerning the differences and the 
commonalities.  
Over and above this, I shall claim that there is a socio-cultural character to the 
development of science, to the extent that the methods of inquiry in science, and the views 
that its practitioners will adopt concerning their subject matter, in the questions that are asked 
and in the choices concerning what work will be carried out, are significantly a function of 
culture and of a cultural history that will be unique to a time and a place. I shall thus in a 
strong manner argue against universalism in scientific method.  
The thesis that I defend about pluralism here is two-fold: 
1. I shall argue on the one hand that by virtue of its ramification into various sub-disciplines, 
each with a distinctive culture of its own, occidental science, neither in its theoretical 
thinking, nor by extension in its methods, is at all a monolithic enterprise. I do 
acknowledge that in its interdisciplinarity science can often benefit from the act of 
“borrowing of knowledge from one field in order to assist the endeavours of another 
discipline” (Kellert 2006: 219). However, in spite the tying-together that this creates, each 
field of science remains distinctive from others. This is the basis of the scientific pluralism 
that Stephen Kellert and Helen Longino1 including a number of more recent philosophers 
of science defend. 
2. On the other hand, I shall argue that if we consider inquiry outside the West, 
acknowledging that every society has unique and distinct and multiple forms of inquiry, 
we should be impressed not only that there is distinctiveness elsewhere but that polylogue 
between occidental science (which is rationality based) and other kinds of inquiry 
                                                 
1 See Stephen H. Kellert, Helen E. Longino and Kenneth Waters (eds) (2006) 
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elsewhere stands to inform occidental science in new ways, as well as stands to inform 
those other kinds of inquiry in new ways. 
 
1. Thesis 1: Methodological Pluralism in Science 
The thesis that science is to become one unified entity theoretically, or alternatively, 
that there is a unity of method in science is central to the argument of the unity of science or a 
unified method in science that Popper and some others endorse. The Logical Positivists and 
the subsequent philosophers of science of the twentieth century including Popper would 
readily attest to the one claim or the other or both. They assume that all the sciences share a 
common method. Even though these scholars do not reach an ostensible agreement over what 
this common method is, they share the assumption that science as such follows one and the 
same universal method across all its sub-disciplines and through the entire history of its 
development.  
Popper and some other philosophers of science long assumed that there would be 
unity to science at least concerning its methods, if not also concerning its theories. They hold 
methods in scientific inquiry to be single and monolithic that all scientific theories are 
derived from. Popper’s assumption is that falsification is a single specifiable system of 
method which can be taken as a paradigm of all the sciences. With his “doctrine of the unity 
of method; that is to say, the view that all theoretical and general sciences use the same kind 
of method, whether they are natural science or social sciences” (Popper 1957: 130) Popper 
emphatically describes the workings in natural science where “we are always concerned with 
explanations, predictions, and tests, and that the method of testing hypotheses is always the 
same” (ibid: 132). For this method of all the sciences, Popper says, we must proceed to test 
theories severely as much as we can in other to find fault with them; in fact, we must try to 
falsify them. Only if we cannot falsify them in spite of our best efforts can we say that are 
corroborated, that is, they have stood up to severe tests. This is the method of falsification 
(ibid: 134). It is the method which holds that any claims to knowledge can be rationally 
criticised, and in the realm of science, such claim to knowledge is to be subjected to the tests 
of refutation in order to be termed scientific. The progress of knowledge, in Popper’s view, is 
concerned with falsification or error elimination (conjecture and refutation) in a bid to 
allowing our most valued sets of knowledge or scientific theories to either stand the test of 
time or be replaced by superior arguments or new scientific theories.Those claims to 
knowledge that are potentially falsifiable can be admitted to the body of empirical science, 
and then further distinguished according to whether they are falsified or indeed are actually 
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retained. If retained, yet further distinction may be made on the basis of how much subjection 
to criticism they have received, how severe such criticism has been, and how probable the 
theory is, with the least probable theory that still withstands attempts to falsify it being the 
one to be preferred. This is the criteria Popper used in distinguishing science from non-
science. So any scientific statements must satisfy this falsification criterion. This falsification 
criterion is the only method, according to Popper, which underlies the testing of theories or 
hypothesis in science.  
The above description of Popper’s theory of falsification pervades the acclaimed 
unified methodological procedure for the workings of science found in the argument that 
concerns the unity of method and unity of theory in science.  The latter kind of unity would 
require reductivism to hold.  The former, methodological kind of unity would not: even if 
reductivism as a thesis that all theory collapses to one theory fails, the thesis of unity of 
method could still be true; or so Popper assumes.  However, the problem is whether at the 
level that we must operate at, of abstraction away from specifics of theory and subject matter, 
there really is much to remark, as common to all inquiries, and all stages of the development 
of those inquiries, through all manner of different forms of theoretical commitment. Surely 
whether there is anything much out there to remark is debatable. Now, if there is nothing, if 
method truly is more technique than the nomenclature well allows us to see, if method is 
therefore theory-dependent and liable to be subject-matter-specific, then we would be wrong 
to expect the two questions, of unity of theory, and of unity of method, truly to come apart 
from one another. The argument that there is no unity of theory (that reductivism fails) would 
begin after all to supply reasons to expect no unity of method but rather plurality of methods.  
That is, anti-reductivism (such as Nancy Cartwright’s) about theory would support pluralism 
about method.  It is also my contention that a reductionist thesis of either sort is not apt: the 
sciences are a plurality, both theoretically, and methodologically. Otto Neurath’s (1934: 353) 
aligns with this argument and berates Popper’s falsificationism, which allegedly presupposes 
a single correct approach that excludes plurality practice in science. In other words, there 
cannot be a unity of laws in science that explain the whole diversity of natural phenomena. 
As well as the fact that there could not be one method that remains the same across all the 
various sub-disciplines of science across the whole history of their developments.  
Again, I question here whether there is one single self-consistent method for 
achieving the aim or progress towards objective truth in science. The issue is whether 
progress towards the goal of science is regulated by a single self-consistent method, any more 
than achievement of it is bound up in a single self-consistent master or reducing theory. I 
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doubt whether science can be made a unity theoretically, for instance, by reduction of every 
special science to one deep science. I furthermore doubt whether there can be one method by 
which all of science can best work.  
The crux of the argument is that it is erroneous to have a universalistic view of 
science when we consider the complexities inherent in the world. The explanations that these 
complexities require cannot suffice by, say, a reductionist approach which explains all 
phenomena in terms of laws of physics2. Cartwright also considers this reductionist view 
which regards physics “to be the governor of all matter” as wrong, and defends the thesis that 
the success of empirical theories of physics may argue for the truth of these theories but they 
are wrong for their universality (1999: 2-4). In other words, the laws of physics alone cannot 
give us the totality of the truth about the world. The various sub-disciplines of science have a 
role to play in developing theories and methods of investigating the reality of phenomena 
they are individually faced with. Although, the inter-disciplinary areas of science have shown 
that nature is relatively interwoven, this does not account for why a call for a unity of science 
is justified. The tendency to reduce science to a single approach, in most cases, physics, is to 
say that the laws of thermodynamics, for instance, are applicable to all the sciences. Such a 
claim is premature because it is not to say that the other sciences can be reduced to physics. 
On the contrary, the other sciences concern phenomena far and away richer in their 
physicality than the science of physics can ever make clear.  To say, for instance, that 
thermo-dynamical principles might constrain what it would be reasonable to think in another 
science, does not suggest that what it is reasonable to say in the other sciences would all 
reduce to or be explained by the laws of thermodynamics. In this connection, a call for a 
unified method in science would not only undermine the necessity of specialising in a 
particular field of science, it would also extend to an imposition of a particular science, 
occidental science in this case, on other concerted forms of enquiries in other cultures. The 
recognition that there exist other standards of enquiries, with their unique ways of carrying 
out researches of various forms, underscores the methodological pluralism that I defend. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2Lee Smolin is baffled by the rigid attention focused on string theory in physics which appears as a unified 
theory in science. His conclusion is that the trend which supports one direction of research while other 
promising approaches are abandoned has tragic consequences as new discoveries in physics have come to a halt 
since the early 1980s (Smolin 2006). 
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2. Thesis II: Epistemic pluralism: The rationality question  
A Universalist, such as Popper, claims that there is one single self-consistent way to 
characterise the rationality of science. Moreover, this one single self-consistent variety of 
pinnacle rationality is according to the Universalist the same everywhere and at all time. That 
is to say, the Universalists claim that what it is for people to be rational in inquiry is outside 
of culture. Popper, in particular, avers in his Conjectures and Refutations that “Western 
civilization is the only civilization which is based upon science ... the rationalist tradition ... 
represents the only practicable way of expanding our knowledge- conjectural or hypothetical 
knowledge, of course. There is no other way” (Popper 1957:151).  This does seem to imply 
that any forms of concerted inquiry different from occidental (Western) science represent 
irrationality. Inferring from Popper’s assertion therefore, we must consider whether Western 
science and culture are the standard for rationality. Again, we must consider whether there is 
any monolithic standard of rationality that can be read out of Western science, or whether 
rationality is a Western signature. Against this claim, I question here whether even within 
canonical science (occidental “science of the West”) there is anything like unity of method. 
Looking more broadly at human inquiry, and choosing as examples some significant features 
of some other systematic indigenous knowledge, such as in Africa or in oriental cultures, I 
will argue here that inquiry that looks different again from this or that exemplary pocket of 
“Western science” that Popper alludes to can however be optimal in its cultural context and 
for purposes that are rooted in the particular culture. Whether the distinctive kind of inquiry, 
in Africa for instance, that I have in mind is science is perhaps a less important question to 
ask than what polylogue would look like between its practitioners and the practitioners of 
“occidental science”. I will maintain that polylogue is needed, and that there would within it 
be learning in all directions.  
Undoubtedly, some accomplishments that have happened to have happened 
specifically in the West are impressive and to that extent that they are objects that other 
cultures should look to with interest.  My interest in Popper is about all this: Popper was 
interested to reflect on a special accomplishment, science, and learn from it about ideals for 
the mind and for society more generally.  Although, I might say that Popper exaggerates the 
extent to which he identifies once and for all what is special about occidental science, and 
that he is particularly over-simplistic as a philosopher of science, but I agree, to some extent, 
and owe some respect even so to Popper’s effort, and beyond that, to the special 
accomplishments to do with science in the West.  What I endorse, however, is of a possibility 
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of polylogue on learning by the West from Africa or oriental cultures, not only learning by 
Africa or oriental cultures from the West. 
In this connection, whether there is a single self-consistent mode of Western 
rationality that could be globalised, that occidental science epitomises, and that occidental 
science vindicates because occidental science is especially rationally impressive, I deny, not 
by denying the impressiveness of science in the West, but by questioning both its ostensible 
unity, and its ostensible monopoly on worth. Let it be clear that I do not deny the tremendous 
importance of the category of rationality in science, and particularly in philosophical 
discourses. A denial of this would defeat the very purpose of this engagement in a 
philosophical activity.  
However, in part, I subscribe to Ludwig Wittgenstein and Peter Winch’s positions 
both of whom have defended the relativity to cultures of rationality itself, a point of view I 
believe is apt for looking into science and for appreciating its variety, as well as for looking 
beyond occidental science to cultures of inquiry in other places and times. Wittgenstein uses 
his theory of the forms of life to argue that different forms of life have varied standards and 
as such the rationality of beliefs in each form of life is an issue of interest within each form of 
life of every culture. On his part, Winch says that Western scientific culture represents a 
standard of rationality that is just one among many, and in some cases members of different 
cultures with different standards of rationality could not possibly comprehend each other’s 
rationality criteria or their application. Winch’s claim is that Western scientific culture cannot 
be the ultimate paradigm upon which the yardstick of rationality is measured. While I share, 
partly, in the positions of both Wittgenstein and Winch that Western scientific culture 
represents a standard of rationality among many standards I think the absolute relativism that 
both contain is too strong for the position of pluralism that I defend which advocates a level 
of dialogue as a unity in the limit. I am particularly concerned about Winch’s extreme 
position as it relates to logic within the Azande’s cultural milieu. I do reckon that no culture 
has a monopoly of rationality but I posit that standard philosophical logic requires a level of 
expertise and literal mindedness. Winch’s anthropological account fails to distinguish this 
standard philosophical logic from the form of logic that pervades the oral culture of the 
Azandes. I do not deny that variations of logical reasoning occur within different cultures. 
My argument is that logic as an intellectual study is essentially the business of the literal 
minded philosopher or scholar and it should be recognized as such.  
On the above showing, the strong relativism that both Wittgenstein and Winch 
express undermines the idea of unity-in-the-limit of what scientific knowledge comes to be 
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known that constitutes the pluralism that I follow C.S Peirce to defend. I support Peirce that 
scientific knowledge is socio-culturally and historically specific, but that there is a quasi-
stable arrangement for all knowledge to come together which signifies the idea of unity-in-
the-limit; a view which allows one to expect that method will be different at different times 
and in connections with different inquiries or socio-cultural arrangements. My defense of 
pluralism also exemplifies the social character of scientific knowledge that Longino 
emphasizes in her attack upon the dichotomization of the rational and the social. Longino 
asserts the thesis that scientific knowledge is both social and rational. She is however 
concerned about the dichotomy of the modalities of knowledge, each of which is differently 
understood by empirical researchers and the normative researchers. This dichotomy is based 
on the illusion that there are just two positions regarding scientific knowledge (rational and 
not social; social and not rational). To her, a realignment of these understandings would bring 
about a new set of interpretations involving interdependence of cognitive agency, plurality of 
content, and contextuality of productive practices (Longino 2002: 203-204)3. This aligns with 
my position on worth of cross-cultural epistemic pluralism as it relates to how knowledge that 
deals with fundamental reality in every culture and how people of every culture perceive this 
reality can be mutually harnessed through a polylogue process of interaction.  
I acknowledge that the phenomenon of occidental science is unique in a certain way 
however.  It burgeons like inquiry nowhere else and at no other time.  Somehow it is 
veritably explosively self-compounding and self-ramifying.  That is a unique fact. 
Nevertheless, the development of knowledge across culture is, without doubt, indicative of 
the power of rationality that human societies are significantly built upon. The 
accomplishments that different cultures all over the world have attained in the thousands of 
years that people have lived in various societies only confirm that systematic indigenous 
knowledge is wrapped around rational enquiries about truth in nature. The criteria for what 
passes as standard of rational form of enquiry in occidental science cannot be used as a 
parameter of what can pass muster as knowledge in other cultures, as experiences, values, 
history and politics differ from one culture to the other.  
There is no gainsaying the fact that occidental science is built upon a formal, both 
empirical and conceptual, structure of knowledge that is instrumental to the study of the 
world within the confines of Western perspective to things. Since what Western scientists do 
is to seek the truth about how the world works, undoubtedly, systematic indigenous societies 
                                                 
3 For further reading on this see Helen E. Longino, The Fate of knowledge, chapters 1, 8 and 9. 
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too have their knowledge-production specialists, and have created ways in which for the 
knowledge produced and held by these specialists to be made relevant to social decision-
making. However, conditions do not seem to obtain for the knowledge-making in systematic 
indigenous societies to be theoretical. It is more conceptual, empirical as well as spiritual. It 
is oriented to the production and retention of useful descriptive knowledge, and not oriented 
towards literal-minded explanation.  It takes a mytho-poetic form, for that is a condition of its 
being memorable, by strictly oral means.  It becomes impressive in its extent and usefulness, 
but is nonetheless limited in its extent by the limited capacity.  
One important feature of mytho-poetic inquiry, that is, its form reflects its being part 
of oral arts of memory method of enquiry which favourably complements others in 
systematic indigenous knowledge, is that it strongly possesses ardent explanatory function, 
and that it is aimed for a rationally systematic ultimate form. Mytho-poetic consciousness is 
spiritual as a matter of course, and mystical too unless one hangs a very rationalist 
understanding upon what ‘mystical’ means. Reactions may trail this as voodooism but it is no 
more than the abstract idea of nous (which sees knowledge as the perception of the mental 
rather than the physical) that is associated with the mystic philosophy of Plotinus. Historical 
records have, in fact, shown that mysticism or religiosity does not in any way hinder the 
progress of knowledge as Western societies were still largely religious while science 
progressed there.  
So, the embrace of the mytho-poetic mode of enquiry that is still associated with 
systematic indigenous knowledge in Africa, in particular, is a furtherance of the claim that the 
spiritual is incidental to the physical. Since the spiritual is believed to affect physical 
phenomena traditional African enquirers do not find them unimportant in the field of enquiry. 
The Logical Positivists verificationist theory and Popper’s demarcation principle do not in 
any way canonically apply to the systematic indigenous knowledge in Africa. African mode 
of enquiry does consider as important phenomena that are not empirically verifiable. Even, 
those metaphysical or psychological issues that Popper regards as pseudoscience have equal 
relevance in the scheme of indigenous mode of enquiry in African epistemology. In view of 
this, what is favourably considered as a mode of inquiry in the African sense is not separated 
from the empirical, material, mechanical, psychological, art, supernatural, religious or the 
spiritual. This is why if we consider the explanations that African intellections give to causal 
events, for instance, we would discover a difference in approach from that of the West. The 
Western scientist is interested in the explanation of empirical causality of what makes event 
‘A’ to cause event ‘B’. The specialist African knowledge enquirer is involved with what can 
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be called ‘agentive causation’. Typically, oral memory arts have as backbone a fabric of 
myths.  Myths are narratives, involving agents. Agentive causation is what makes for 
narrative.  The knowledge for which mnemonics arts are provided via or within the myths 
picks up as part of its form the myths’ attribution of causal agency to its protagonists.  The 
rainbow is defined as God’s covenant for example, or as offspring to wonder and mother of 
love.  This is agentive causality: the kind that can figure in stories, with agents, most of them 
human or humanlike, e.g. ancestors or gods.  
 
3. Value of cross-cultural polylogue: The argument  
The focus here is to establish that there is a broad spectrum of epistemological 
approaches to the study of nature not limited to occidental science. One main feature of 
occidental science is the ways it vaults commitment to reason and ardent literal-mindedness. 
This is its greatest strength rather than a weakness. However, this is unaffordable to a people 
that use oral means to hold onto its knowledge; as well as to criticise the indigenous 
knowledge-making practices. These people are not liable to producing burgeoning 
explanatory knowledge at the explosive pace of scientific knowledge development in the 
West.  However, in a relative degree, each is inferior to the other with respect to a 
desideratum that the other holds dear and needs to hold dear. This is why I defend the thesis 
of the value of cross-cultural polylogue. polylogue is needed among specialists, scientists and 
even philosophers of different systematic indigenous knowledge in order to learn about 
variations of thinking in various cultural thoughts. 
My argument is that each tradition will become aware of the need to reject or 
obliterate some of its former thinking, by virtue of what it learns through polylogue, and in 
particular, by virtue of new criticism realised through polylogue. There are however certain 
preconditions and limitations to be considered, as well as expectable results of such a 
polylogue. Using Franz Wimmer’s (1996) idea of intercultural philosophy as a model, there 
is the need to distinguish different grades and forms of the influence of one or more traditions 
upon other traditions and how this can translate to a cross-cultural polylogue. The statistics I 
am to use here emanate from my understanding of the stages of contemporary scientific 
developments in four (4) basic traditions “A, B, C, D” to be examined and distinguished. For 
purposes of illustration, traditions A= occident, B= East Asia, C= Middle East, D= Africa. 
The following models illustrate whether there might be unilateral or bilateral influences of 
one tradition over the others and how a polylogue can be achieved. The models can be 
distinguished as follows. 
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Model 1: Unilateral centristic influence: 
A כ ~[( B. C). D] 
In this model, the possibility of a polylogue among the four traditions is not visible as 
tradition A sees the remaining traditions B, C and D as inferior to it, and hence to be 
eliminated and replaced. Traditions B, C, and D also stand apart from each other. In the case 
of tradition A, its task is the cultural extension of its influence over others in order to 
eliminate and replace B, C, and D. This can be labeled as cultural imperialism, Euro-
centrism, Westernization, colonization or civilization.  These labels can be predicated on a 
certain moral order seen as ‘the white man’s burden’. This burden is based on the assumption 
that it was the responsibility of the West to bring the benefits of civilization to the rest of the 
world.  As such, Western superior morality applies universally regardless of race, cultural 
reality, political affinity, nationality etc. This assertion enjoyed the torrent supports of Lucien 
Levy Bruhl (1985: 63) and G.W.F Hegel in Philosophy of History (1956: 93) who 
standardized the colonial discourse when they both commissioned rationality as a Western 
signature, and thus granting what they termed mystic or prelogical thinking to non-Western 
peoples.  
 
Model 2: Unilateral and transitive influence: 
{[(A כ B) . (A כ C)]  . (A כ D)}.  B כ C 
In this model, for the tradition A every other tradition remains inferior; B ignores D, 
C also ignores D. The influence of tradition A continues to extend on B, C and D. No 
polylogues are visible, except for tradition B which extends a hand of fellowship to C and 
consequently influences C with concepts partly derived from A.  
 
Model 3: Partially bilateral influence: the period of dialogues 
{[(A כ B) . (A כ C)] . [(B כ C) . (B כ D)]} כ [(C כ D) . (A כ D)] 
Partially bilateral influences are processes of selective acculturation. For tradition A, 
some other traditions are not inferior any longer, but exotic. The same holds for B, C, and D 
in an increasing manner, but mutual influencing are not yet complete. This stage represents a 
polylogue among all relevant traditions with the partial exclusion of D which B still stands 
apart from.  
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Model 4: Complete bilateral influence: the period of polylogues 
{[(A כ B) . (A כ C) (A כ D)] . [(B כ C) . (B כ D)]} כ (C כ D) 
This is the stage where the value of cross-cultural polylogue is appreciated. For every 
tradition to be different is exotic: the consequent form of a polylogue. This stage symbolizes 
that every tradition has unique and distinct and multiple forms of inquiry. What is impressive 
is that the distinctiveness in each tradition would enhance polylogue among them. The 
knowledge that can be gained in occidental science, for instance, stands to inform those other 
systematic kinds of inquiry in new ways as well as stands to inform occidental science in new 
ways. 
 
Conclusion 
To ask whether there is a possibility of a cross-cultural polylogue in science as well as 
in knowledge in general is to beg the question. The evidence of divergent cultural traditions 
and what is distinctive in each can be used to establish the thesis of pluralism in different 
kinds of inquiry. A kind of inquiry which aims to provide answers that are intended to be 
universally true would ostensibly undermine the linguistic and conceptual tools that are also 
valuable in other traditions and cultures. This is the value with respect to the possibility and 
necessity of cross-cultural polylogue among all traditions. A suitable process of attaining this 
is to ensure that issues and questions concerning reality, man and the universe are not 
understood only under the purview of Euro-centrism, for instance. This presupposes that 
many other traditions have their diverse understandings of the subject matter. What can 
achieve a mutually bilateral understanding is the possibility of a cross- cultural polylogue. 
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